The warning is from Cary Huang and here is one bit
However, relying on the strongman model is risky, both for Xi himself and the country. It puts the steering wheel of the world’s most populous nation and second largest economy in the hands of one person, spelling danger when that helmsman gets old or ill – as was seen in Mao’s later days. The model makes it harder for Xi to avoid misjudgments and policy mistakes as few will dare to speak out. Removing term limits will help prevent future challenges to Xi’s authority and legitimacy, but the resurgence of strongman politics could intensify internal power struggles as factions will compete for the powers and resources once shared among all.
You can read the rest here.
This time in Pakistan. This follows Djibouti, China’s first overseas military base as well as China’s purchase of Hambantota port in Sri Lanka.
Here is the headline in SCMP.
First Djibouti … now Pakistan port earmarked for a Chinese overseas naval base, sources say.
You can read more here.
India announced it will build a similar style base in the island state of Seychelles.
The Indian Ocean is shaping up as the candidate to figure out if China’s rise will be peaceful or not. Keep in eye on this region.
Two recent articles on the deepening ties of China and the Western Hemisphere.
Defense One has a piece on Chinese courting Latin American generals with lavish gifts and military training, building strategic ties with those who control the military in Latin America. Here is how the article opens
China has started to woo America’s nearest allies by funding “lavish” trips for Latin American military officers to live and study across the Pacific. Beijing is courting officers from the region, offering to cover the cost of military education and travel, Adm. Kurt Tidd, the commander of U.S. Southern Command, told lawmakers Thursday.
In a separate piece, Briebeart reports that “Adm. Kurt Tidd, the commander of SOUTHCOM, testified that Beijing has already pledged $500 billion in trade funds with various Latin American countries and $250 billion in Chinese direct investment over the next decade, adding:
American grand strategy is almost entirely designed to prevent a regional hegemonic power from being able to roam in America’s back yard. It has long been suspected that the OBOR was the economic groundwork for a later security architecture. As well, Latin America has a history of military coups. According to research done by Marsteintredet & Berntzen (2008), 8 since 1991 alone. Both articles indicate China is laying the groundwork to act more aggressively in the West. It is not unreasonable to be concerned with this as there is probably a huge demand for their model among certain generals. That is, grow rich but retain political control.
The impending clash between America and China that is. It seems that what separates China and American (culture) and what they have in common (a superiority complex and obsession to be number one) all lead to war.
I’m more optimistic, but what is laid out in the article is compelling.
Here is one bit regarding the Chinese view on America’s most prized export.
For Americans, democracy is the only just form of government: authorities derive their legitimacy from the consent of the governed. That is not the prevailing view in China, where it is common to believe that the government earns or losses political legitimacy based on its performance. In a provocative TED Talk delivered in 2013, the Shanghai-based venture capitalist Eric Lichallenged democracy’s presumed superiority. “I was asked once, ‘The party wasn’t voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?’” he recounted. “I said, ‘How about competency?’” He went on to remind his audience that in 1949, when the Chinese Community Party took power, “China was mired in civil war, dismembered by foreign aggression, [and] average life expectancy at that time [was] 41 years. Today [China] is the second-largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity.”
Highly recommended you read all of it which can be found here.
Good and brief discussion of the Quad written in the South China Morning Post today.
Proposed in 2007 by Japan, the Quad would consist of Japan, Australia, India and the United States.
The proposed alliance (which arguable already exists) is more than capable of confronting China if need be. Collectively they represent approximalty 25 percent of the worlds population (compared to 18.6 percent for China) and approximately 36 percent of the worlds GDP (compared to 15 percent of China).
There would be possible shrieking but there are strong incentives to cooperate on such a self-interested task. For one, all 4 have comparable ideologies and political systems. But 2, and most importantly, all 4 own genuine interests in shaping the rise of China.
Instead of being the dominant player, the self anointed leader of the free world should pursue a more distributive role and allocate more responsibility to its regional allies.
Here is one bit.
Number three, we have to work as closely as we possibly can with China in particular to work toward more of a coordinated strategy. The game we have played with China, and that China plays with us, is that we always tell China, “You could bring these guys to heel; if you really, really wanted to do it, you could.” The Chinese will say, “You Americans, you’re the threat to them,” and so on. We blame one another — that creates running room for North Korea.
You can read the rest here.
The four-lane highway leading out of the Sri Lankan town of Hambantota gets so little traffic that it sometimes attracts more wild elephants than automobiles. The pachyderms are intelligent — they seem to use the road as a jungle shortcut — but not intelligent enough, alas, to appreciate the pun their course embodies: It links together a series of white elephants, i.e. boondoggles, built and financed by the Chinese. Beyond the lonely highway itself, there is a 35,000-seat cricket stadium, an almost vacant $1.5 billion deepwater port and, 16 miles inland, a $209 million jewel known as “the world’s emptiest international airport.”
You can read the rest here.
China also established its first overseas military base, conveniently located in Djibouti, near a valuable global shipping lane and just four miles from a U.S. installation. In addition, Chinese warships have been popping up all over the globe, including near Alaska, Japan, and Australia. While their movement thus far has been through international waters, and therefore not in violation of any international law, it is a clear sign of China’s desire to be taken seriously as a global military power. Too bad Beijing doesn’t respect that same right when other countries attempt to exercise their freedom of navigation in the South and East China Seas.
and there is this as well.
There is a slight cause for optimism on this front. An exclusive story from Breitbart last week claims the White House has approved a proposed plan crafted by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis to conduct regular freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, or FONOPs. According to an anonymous U.S. official, Mattis wants to change the nature of conducting FONOPs. Instead of sending discrete requests to the National Security Council each time the U.S. Navy plans such an operation, he allegedly outlined a schedule for conducting them regularly throughout the rest of the year.
Carrying out FONOPs is a good way to challenge Beijing’s claims on the high seas. Despite China’s aggressive provocation, the Obama administration put an end to FONOPs from 2012 to 2015, and only conducted three in 2016 out of fear of upsetting Beijing (because appeasing a revanchist power always turns out so well). So far this year, the Trump administration has carried out three FONOPs and clearly has plans for several more. Let’s hope the Breitbart story is accurate and these become much more frequent as the year wears on.
You can read the article in its entirety here.
Here is one piece
U.S. policymakers should recognize that China’s behavior in the sea is based on its perception of how the United States will respond. The lack of U.S. resistance has led Beijing to conclude that the United States will not compromise its relationship with China over the South China Sea. As a result, the biggest threat to the United States today in Asia is Chinese hegemony, not great-power war. U.S. regional leadership is much more likely to go out with a whimper than with a bang.
here is another
For the same reason, U.S. President Donald Trump’s idea of reviving President Ronald Reagan’s strategy of “peace through strength” by beefing up the U.S. military will not hold China back on its own. The problem has never been that China does not respect U.S. military might. On the contrary, it fears that it would suffer badly in a war with the United States. But China also believes that the United States will impose only small costs for misdeeds that stop short of outright aggression. No matter how many more warships, fighter jets, and nuclear weapons the United States builds, that calculus will not change.
The publication is Foreign Affairs. I disagree with most of what the author has to say but the piece is well written and worth a read.
You can read the rest here.
Xi’s narrative of rejuvenation has resonated deeply among today’s Chinese. It places the country not only at the center of the international system but also above it, casting the nation as one that inspires emulation by the force of its advanced culture and economic achievements. It also evokes historical memories of a time when China received tribute from the rest of the world, was a source of world-class innovation, and was a fearless seafaring power. And it implies that in the past, China did not need to use force: its virtue alone engendered deference from others.
The subtile of the article is How China’s Imagined Past Shapes its Present and the author is Elizabeth Economy. You can read the rest here.