Course Correction: How to Stop China’s Maritime Advance

Here is one piece

U.S. policymakers should recognize that China’s behavior in the sea is based on its perception of how the United States will respond. The lack of U.S. resistance has led Beijing to conclude that the United States will not compromise its relationship with China over the South China Sea. As a result, the biggest threat to the United States today in Asia is Chinese hegemony, not great-power war. U.S. regional leadership is much more likely to go out with a whimper than with a bang.

here is another

For the same reason, U.S. President Donald Trump’s idea of reviving President Ronald Reagan’s strategy of “peace through strength” by beefing up the U.S. military will not hold China back on its own. The problem has never been that China does not respect U.S. military might. On the contrary, it fears that it would suffer badly in a war with the United States. But China also believes that the United States will impose only small costs for misdeeds that stop short of outright aggression. No matter how many more warships, fighter jets, and nuclear weapons the United States builds, that calculus will not change.

The publication is Foreign Affairs. I disagree with most of what the author has to say but the piece is well written and worth a read.

You can read the rest here.

History With Chinese Characteristics

Xi’s narrative of rejuvenation has resonated deeply among today’s Chinese. It places the country not only at the center of the international system but also above it, casting the nation as one that inspires emulation by the force of its advanced culture and economic achievements. It also evokes historical memories of a time when China received tribute from the rest of the world, was a source of world-class innovation, and was a fearless seafaring power. And it implies that in the past, China did not need to use force: its virtue alone engendered deference from others.

The subtile of the article is How China’s Imagined Past Shapes its Present and the author is Elizabeth Economy. You can read the rest here.

What Does Xi Jinping Want?

According to Graham Allison, he wants

How will Xi “make China great again”?  After studying the man, listening to his words, and speaking to those who understand him best, I believe for Xi this means:

  • Returning China to the predominance it enjoyed in Asia before the West intruded;
  • Reestablishing control over the territories the Communist Party considers to be “greater China,” including not just Xinjiang and Tibet on the mainland, but Hong Kong and Taiwan;
  • Recovering its historic sphere of influence along its borders and in the adjacent seas so that others give it the deference great nations have always demanded;
  • Commanding the respect of other great powers in the councils of the world.

and then notes

At the core of these national goals is a civilizational creed that sees China as the center of the universe. In the Chinese language, the word for China, zhong guo (中国), means “Middle Kingdom.” “Middle” refers not to the space between other, rival kingdoms, but to all that lies between heaven and earth. As Lee summarized the worldview shared by hundreds of Chinese officials who sought his advice, they “recall a world in which China was dominant and other states related to them as supplicants to a superior, as vassals that came to Beijing bearing tribute.” In this narrative, the rise of the West in recent centuries is a historical anomaly, reflecting China’s technological and military weakness when it faced dominant imperial powers during a “century of humiliation” from roughly 1839 to 1949. Xi Jinping has promised his fellow citizens: no more.

This is from a May 2017 and you can read the rest here.

Do we want China to reform?

Moody’s recently downgraded China sovereign debt, a move which was probably overdue.

The article I link to writes that China “has 70 percent more money sloshing around its economy than the United States does, even though the American economy is bigger.”

As well, “More than half of the bank debt in China consists of loans from state-owned banks to state-owned enterprises.”

This isn’t sustainable and is only one aspect of the fragility of the Chinese economy. Other  issues include rising labor costs (making it increasingly difficult to rely on their workhorse model of exporting labor intensive goods), overcapacity, and a still sizeable amount of party corruption.

All of this suggests that China is headed towards an economic crash.

From a security perspective, most analysis I read imply that it is in American interest for the Chinese to reform their economy. The general line of thought is that Chinese economic reforms will help avoid a future economic crash that leads to some sort of nationalist inspired confrontation between China and the regional players (either America or our allies). Yet from a security perspective, if economic power is the best indicator of state power and China is indeed the next and most probable serious contender to America regional hegemony, it’s not clear that America would want China to reform.

For one, all major wars have been the result of an emerging power seeking to reorder its neighborhood to its likening. From Athens and Sparta to Nazi Germany and Europe, the wars that define eras are from not from the emerging powers stagnating but from emerging powers continued rise.

But two, the biggest geopolitical beneficiary of the American financial crisis of 08 was arguable China. It not only gained persuasive power for its style of politics, but from a pure relative power perspective, 2008 was a blessing to China.

Below are IMF data for the GDP based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) share of world total expressed in percent of world GDP in PPP dollars. This is obviously crude and it’s difficult to know how much of the Chinese growth captured by the data is genuine but the chart is still informative.

 

You can find the data here.

Avoiding a Sino-American Confrontation: Why the US Should Accommodate a Rising China.

Many good points made in a Christopher Layne brief discussing how to manage China’s rise.

Here is one.

First, without delving too deeply into the arcane details of nuclear weapons strategy, we know that, because of the “stability/instability paradox,” although nuclear armed states are deterred from using nuclear weapons against each other, they are not stopped from fighting a conventional war. This isn’t speculation: in the 1999 Kargil conflict, India and Pakistan — both armed with nuclear weapons — fought each other with conventional forces.

 

It is ungated and can be read in it’s entirety here

China as the non revisionist power.

Analogies to other rising powers with shallower histories — France, the United States, Germany, Japan, the USSR — are not helpful in predicting the consequences of China’s rise. China has no messianic ideology to export; no doctrine of “manifest destiny” to advance; no belief in social Darwinism or imperative of territorial expansion to act upon; no cult of the warrior to animate militarism or glorify war; no exclusion from contemporary global governance to overcome; no satellite states to garrison; no overseas colonies or ideological dependencies to protect; no history of power projection or military intervention beyond its immediate frontiers; no entangling alliances or bases abroad.

This is supportive of the logic of accommodation and against  the logic of confrontation.

You can read the rest here.